Immigration: The Search for Internal Cohesion

This is a (long) proposal that seeks to build a framework in which to discuss immigration policy. My goal was to keep it to 1500 words, but given the depth of the topic, I ended up with 3400 words. I finished this at Starbucks with electronic dance music in my ears, and a blond roast coffee at my side.

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A Concise Proposal of a Broad-Brushed Immigration Policy

My elevator speech for an ideal immigration policy would look like this: the state ought to enforce strong border control while taking into strong consideration people’s right to freedom of movement, basic human rights for refugees who seek asylum due to self-preservation, and consideration for the cultural and economic impact upon the host country. These are noble considerations because they serve to protect the internal cohesion of the state through the self-determination of its people. These considerations are elevated for the sole purpose of demonstrating that solidarity through citizenship is a treasured ideal over and above an indiscriminate open border policy. For the immigrant, a process toward citizenship serves the purpose of civic integration into the culture at large. In doing so, a reciprocal relationship is created between the citizen and the state by which the citizen is enfranchised with basic rights and liberties to thrive while also assuming obligations to abide by the laws and policies of the state and participating in the democratic process.

In essence, this is an argument for what is called weak moral cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism is defined as belonging to all the world; but not limited to just one part of the world. Thus, ‘weak’ cosmopolitanism places some restrictions on the free movement of individuals. The word ‘moral’ is added because immigration policy has principles that cross the threshold into rightness and wrongness. For instance, denying refugees completely when their lives are at stake is an example of the moral implications an immigration policy may have. Enough of defining terms, let’s move on.

Therefore, the state needs strong borders along with a pathway to citizenship that seeks to foster solidarity and national identity through civic integration. The reason is that the internal cohesion of the state is of utmost importance.

Hiker’s Analogy

Suppose you are hiking through Yosemite National Park and come upon a stranded hiker in need of water and suffering from severe dehydration. To turn away and say that her plight is of no concern to you would be immoral. The basic point is that you owe her some consideration; you cannot ignore her. Now let us suppose that having her thirst slaked, she sees that you are carrying your personal journal in hand, and she requests to have it – outright. Do you oblige her newest desire? Not necessarily. You are justified in feeling obligated to nourish her back to good health if you have the means, but in no way are you obligated to give her your personal journal.

This illustration serves to highlight how we can approach immigration. For starters, states must consider the impact of the policies they pursue on both those outside and inside of their borders. With the recent diaspora of refugees fleeing their war-torn countries, it’s a matter of self-preservation and human rights. With economic migrants, it’s a matter of fleeing poverty. For others, it’s simply a search for something new, or to be near friends and family, or work and career. Going back to the analogy, the slaked hiker is akin to the refugee, in that there is an urgent need in which one’s life is at stake. The hiker’s request for the personal journal is akin to the Filipino person wanting to join her cousins in San Francisco – permanently. Thus, we are obligated to open our borders to refugees whose lives hang in the balance, but we should have restrictions for others whose human rights are not at stake.

Furthermore, we must always consider the effects of our actions on all those who will bear the consequences, no matter who they are or whether they are in any way connected to us. Second, if there are no relevant differences between people, we should afford them equal consideration. Immigrants are human beings, thus deserving of a moral standing just like us. We cannot act toward them in ways that violate their human rights, and in many cases, we have positive duties to help protect those rights. It also gives us reasons if we decide to refuse people’s demands or requests, even when no rights are at stake.

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The Goal of a Good Immigration Policy: Internal Cohesion

Strong borders, a judicious state, and civic integration can act as a lever to control the flow of immigrants. This paramount for the pursuit of internal cohesion of the state. I discuss the need for strong borders and the judicious state later in the essay, but for now, I want to highlight the crucial element of civic integration.

Civic integration has to do with the ‘bringing together’ of people to a common understanding of the hosts country’s expectation and obligations for civility. This may sound like tacit paternalism, but it need not be if, and when, the host country adheres to the democratic process and respects the self-determination of its citizens. Civic integration helps immigrants understand the culture and values of their new society.  This is crucial for any country that sees the virtue in a unified homogeneous society.

Critical to civic integration is an agreement (based on recognition and respect) that the immigrant makes with it’s host country. First, the immigrant must possess proficiency in the language of the host country. I note this first because communication is a vital element for building social bonds within a civil society. Second, the immigrant should have knowledge of how the government functions. Within a liberal state, voting rights and the legislation of laws help the immigrant gain a voice within the democratic process. Third, the immigrant should understand the laws and policies of the host country. Quite often, the liberal state has freedoms and liberties that are not embraced by most illiberal countries, thus, an understanding of laws and policies helps immigrants know what is expected for a well-ordered liberal society. Fourth, the immigrant should possess recognition of the cultural values. Families coming in that believe in, for example, arranged marriages or polygamy will need to learn the lay of the land in order to coexist within the liberal state. Given that every society has a unique culture with particular values, recognition of host country’s culture helps the immigrant understand what is important to the culture around them.

I’d be remised if I didn’t call upon a distinction between integration and assimilation. In considering civic integration, it is not expected that the immigrant abandons their culture and values and adopt the culture and values of the host country. For this is what assimilation assumes. To the contrary, my argument for civic integration assumes the immigrant holds on to what is dear to them, while also recognizing and respecting the new culture they find themselves in. The is not paternalism, rather the goal is for a society that aims at the internal cohesion for the good of all people that inhabit the country.

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Immigration Policies that Promotes and Protects National Identity

Integral to the internal cohesion of the state is the concept of national identity. In today’s parlance, national identity is equated with white chauvinism. This is in part due to a postmodernist attempt to deconstruct ‘white colonialism’. However, I choose to use national identity to describe the solidarity felt and expressed by a diverse group of citizens. Strong borders, a judicious state, and civic integration help control the influx of immigrants while keeping a watchful eye on the resentment or hostility felt with the change to culture.

Germany serves as an example of how a sharp spike in multi-culturalism actually erodes national identity. With thousands and thousands of accepted refugees – without much burden-sharing from neighboring countries – Germans are now brewing with resentment. I am sure that talk of anti-multiculturalism strikes many as inherent racism, but this is a misnomer. The reality is that human beings have proclivities to be around people who are like them. For an in-depth study on this subject, please see: “Who Trusts Others?” Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara (Journal of Public Economics). We are disposed to sympathize with, help, trust, and take responsibility for those with whom we feel we have something in common. A sense of identity creates this feeling of likeness even with people with whom we are not in direct contact. The evidence shows that those who adhere to a richer, and therefore potentially more exclusive, understanding of what it means to belong to nation X are also likely to identify more strongly with X – and therefore more willing to display solidarity with other members of X, provided they see them as members in good standing.

Solidarity is the aim of national identity. As David Miller notes, “a nation-state has a more communitarian character by virtue of the way that its members identify with each other, making it easier to adopt policies that favor the less well-off, especially those who are able to make little or no contribution to the productive economy (Strangers in our Midst).” It seems true that the states whose citizens have been most ready to promote egalitarian forms of social justice, such as the Scandinavian social democracies, have also been those in which national identity is at its strongest.

Why Not Completely Open Our Borders?

One can begin with the idea that the earth as a whole is the common property of all the human beings who inhabit it, from which some draw the corollary that it is wrong to refuse anyone access to part of what they own. This idea of common ownership has a long history that can be found in classical sources from Hugo Grotius and Kant. The idea rests on the premise that God has given the world to mankind as a common inheritance, which means that each person is entitled to take the natural resources that he needs to sustain himself on the assumption that this is not to the detriment of anyone else.

A lot can be said in refuting the complete open border policy, so I will limit my response to three short arguments. First, open borders could very well lead to a “tragedy of the commons.” Let’s face it, people want to live where people are thriving, the quality of life is high, and there is ample opportunity for success. What meets these criteria? Liberal democracies. Thus, if everyone emigrates their homeland to, say, the United States or the Scandinavian countries, there will be an overuse of resources in that particular area. Imagine millions and millions of Syrians and Eritreans descending upon New York City or Zurich. Think not just of the overuse of resources, but also of the upheaval to the economy, infrastructure, employment, and culture.

Second, open borders will lead to brain drain. In other words, a rapid depletion of the brightest minds. This argument has to do with the notion that many poorer countries best and brightest will leave for greener pastures. Many of the West African, especially India, are experiencing this now with their best doctors and engineers leaving for the United States.

Lastly, open borders will change the cultural landscape which will negatively impact social cohesion and instill distrust. A rapid population spike with one or several groups from the outside will be almost impossible for the host country to immediately embrace. For such growth will result in a clash of cultures and values, thus causing the host country to lose its social equilibrium. A slower integration policy may be more manageable for a host country. As I mentioned earlier, research demonstrates empirically that multiculturalism can foster distrust and undercuts the social capital in communities with a shared identity (A. Alesina, E. Ferrara, “Who Trusts Others?”). Throughout history when we see large swaths of one culture descend upon another culture who already possesses engrained values and norms, hostility and suspicion become the ‘new normal’. One need only look toward the West Bank to see the net result of multiculturalism. This argument rests on the premise that we are disposed to sympathize with, help, trust, and take responsibility for those with whom we feel we have something in common.

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Why Not Completely Close Our Borders?

If we are going to discuss closed borders, then we need to consider two key points that are tied together. First, a closed border policy is completely antithetical to a liberal society. Intrinsic to a liberal society are freedoms and liberties that embolden the self-determination of its citizens. By closing borders, the state would function less like a liberal one and, potentially, more like a totalitarian state with many protectionist measures that forces compliance and uniformity. Second, a closed border system violates our freedom of movement and freedom of association. To be fair, restrictions can often at times be justified given the consequences of have large swaths of people flooding a country. However, the reasons often given for closing one’s borders often cloak a whole host of illiberal ideas. Here are some common arguments for closing our borders followed by a quick rebuttal:

“We need to maintain our distinctive culture.”

If you think so, then to maintain a liberal culture, you should also in principle be willing to censor certain points of view or forbid or ban certain religions. You might favor forced indoctrination into liberal ideas. Again, if that’s a good reason to close borders, why is it not also a good reason to censor certain ideas, ban certain forms of music, or ban certain religions? Why not mandate that people support and participate in certain cultural practices?

“We need to prevent domestic wages from falling.”

This has minimal credence based on the Migration Observatory which concluded: “Evidence to date suggests little effect on employment and unemployment of UK-born workers, but that wages for the low paid may be lowered as a result of migration, although again this effect is modest.” (Dr Martin Ruhs, Dr Carlos Vargas-Silva, The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford). We may ought to be careful building a doctrine against open borders when the impact is “modest.”

Even so, this argument can still lead to a worse notion, for example, in forbidding women from entering jobs because of their effect on the wages for men. If domestic wages are the concerns, then the argument can be played out to highlight the economic impact between numerous groups and classes.

“Immigrants will eat up the welfare state.”

This is one argument that does lack empirical evidence. It also leaves out the vast population of (white) citizens who are unemployed and impoverished that eat a greater percentage from the welfare state. Furthermore, is this not also an argument for restricting births, or forbidding internal migration, or even requiring some people to give birth?

“Immigrants will cause crime.”

Isn’t this also an argument for eugenics or for internal migration restrictions? For instance, should Vermont ban young black men from moving there? If banning rap music reduced crime, would you favor that?

The Liberal Concept of Territorial Jurisdiction

A better argument that moves away from absolute closed borders is one that favors the state’s right to territorial jurisdiction. I contend that this is the best form of governance for immigration because it (1) helps with social order, (2) takes basic human rights into consideration, and (3) ensures the security of self-determination through democracy.

Before moving on, what do I mean by territorial jurisdiction? I mean having rights of jurisdiction over a given territory implies having the right to control the movement of people in and out of that territory, so that where a state can legitimately exercise jurisdiction it is also entitled to exclude immigrants if it so wishes. Territorial jurisdiction means the state possesses and exercises rights to make and enforce laws through a corpus of law that is applied uniformly to everyone. Having made clear that important distinction, I will now defend the three points above regarding why territorial jurisdiction works best.

First, territorial jurisdiction helps with securing social order through enfranchising the democratic process to all citizens as opposed to coercing individuals into submission. I will not speak any more about this point since I believe the democratic process is self-evidently better than coercion by the state. Second, territorial jurisdiction helps with consideration of basic human rights through a well-functioning legal system sets parameters of protection so that individuals can go about their lives without the threat of personal violence theft, and destitution. Third, territorial jurisdiction ensures the self-determination of its citizens by putting the power in the hands of the people rather than the state. A key feature to this point is that territorial jurisdiction gives it occupants representation from the state.

Closing borders may give inhabitants the feeling of security and protection, but ultimately it can potentially nourish totalitarian ideas. Liberalism, while only several hundred years old, provides us with a useful template to see how the expansion and extension of individual rights creates a diverse population with more opportunities to express their autonomy under a legal system that seeks to harness criminal behavior for the protection of its individuals. Territorial jurisdiction is thus intertwined with liberalism and acts as a lever to control population increases while keeping in mind social order, basic human rights, and the self-determination of its citizens.

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Closing Thoughts

One of the basic freedoms that we ought to possess is freedom of movement. But with all freedoms, comes distinctions that need to be made, along with consequences that must be considered. I have attempted to lay out an argument for weak moral cosmopolitanism that defends the claim that while people have the right of freedom of movement, it ought to be limited because of its consequences. Furthermore, immigrants are deserving of a moral standing as the citizens in the host country. Thus, basic human rights mean that any refugee fleeing terror ought to be given a country that affords them the basic rights to survive. Granted, there should be burden-sharing between countries so that, for example, Germany isn’t the only country that is willing to accept refugees.

The reason why I began with a thought experiment of the hiker is because it’s an oversimplified picture that helps us see the raw elements of immigration. There is an element that shows that we are obligated to do something when someone’s life hangs in the balance, and another element that shows that we are completely justified in saying “no” when, for instance, the hiker asked for your journal.

The current hot button topic revolves around economic migrants. The sad fact is that their undocumented status has created un under-class of Mexicans and Central Americans who are work hard but have such limited rights for basic care. The economic migrant is the person whose life is not in peril but simply wanting to flee an impoverished environment in the hopes of better opportunities somewhere else. It should be noted that economic migrants bring value to their host country if they go through the process of becoming a citizen. After all, it is expected that they will integrate with the ideals of their new country through work, pay taxes, and engage in the democratic process. And this is where the state, through the democratic process, ought to consider the consequences and benefits of the economic migrant upon the society at large. What we are seeing today are corporations exploiting the cheap labor of economic migrants, thus creating an under-class, all the while profiting with no repercussions to the suits and ties. Perhaps instead of using federal money to build a wall, we should discuss penalties for corporations that continue to exploit economic migrants.

Turning people away may seem harsh and unfair. However, the ideal of solidarity and national identity are crucial for the well-being of any country. An immigration policy that is built on the pursuit of solidarity is one that is deliberate about upholding the culture and values that engender pride for one’s country. My simple claim is that strong borders, a judicious state and civic integration can act as levers to control the influx of immigrants in order to allow solidarity to thrive.

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How Are Values Formed?

Written over the course of two days, and finished in Starbucks in San Jose, CA with electronic dance music pounding in my head, and a grande blonde roast that tastes horrible because I’ve given up sugar. Enjoy the essay!

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Values

When I look back at my belief system while growing up in Dallas, Texas (1976-2001), they are much different than my current belief system that’s been enculturated in liberal Silicon Valley (2013-2019). I remember being taught and believing that inter-racial marriage was wrong, that being gay was immoral, and that any type of governmental distribution of wealth was wrong because hand-outs to those in need simply incentivized laziness. I distinctly remember as a junior in college, cutting and gluing a picture of a grotesque dead fetus to a sign that would later be used at a nearby pro-life rally. When I look back, I can’t believe the contrast in values from then to now. Currently, my more liberal values are a vast contrast to the prior ‘me’.

How did the ‘me’ of 2001 have such contrasting values than the ‘me’ of 2019? Was ‘southern me’ just a red-neck with antiquated values; while the ‘Silicon Valley me’ is enlightened?

When I contemplate my contrasting selves, I can’t help but want to explore the question: how do we form our values? Are values given from the heavens (i.e. God), are the genetic, or are the dynamic and happen as we simply experience life. This begs a follow-up question: are values absolute or cultural?

I truly believe that values are formed based on our life experiences. With that, I do believe they are also bound by culture. I don’t, however, believe that values come from the heavens, rather, I believe that values are imposed on us as children from early on while forming the basis and justification of our morality and ethics. Values such as care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, sanctity/degradation, authority/subversion, and liberty/oppression are ingrained in us from early on, and while they are malleable, they inform our ethics and politics. Moreover, I believe that all values are ingrained with intentions to promote ‘the good’, however, because values are culture bound, what’s good for one culture may be (and often is) deemed an abomination by another. Herein lies the ultimate irresolvable dilemma.

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How are Values Formed?

Value formation is the confluence of our personal experiences and particular culture we are entwined in. Values are imposed from our family in childhood and reinforced through culture and life experiences. The value of, for example, kindness was imposed on me from my parents, and reinforced throughout early childhood. Then I applied that value on the school playground and experienced how it helped me create greater social bonds with my school mates. My personal experiences growing up reinforced the value of kindness as I experienced the adaptive effects of showing kindness and the maladaptive effects when choosing malice over kindness. All through my upbringing, both my personal experiences and cultural surroundings both reinforced the value of kindness.

Having been born and raised in Dallas, Texas, the values of rugged individualism, church, and God was ingrained in my psyche from birth. Each of those three values, as I grew older, eventually formed the foundation of my worldview and politics. In a sense, our values, imposed upon us early in childhood, become the spectacles in which we view and judge the world.

Our culture plays a huge role in our value formation. Culture gives us a community and shared reality so that we can cooperate in activities and customs that give meaning, purpose, and significance to our existence. Culture gives us prescriptions for appropriate conduct so that we can learn best how to get along with others. All you have to do is travel to another country to see how values ebb and flow with culture. You can travel to China and see how they elevate the group and family over the individual in contrast to most Americans; you can see how South Americans elevate hospitality and care for their elderly unlike most Americans; and how Hawaiians elevate relaxation and balance unlike most urban metropolitan cities in the U.S. (I am obviously speaking in general terms rather than absolutely)

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If you live in the hills of West Virginia and coal mining is your life, and it’s what feeds your family, then you are less likely to support environmental policy that does away with coal mining. If, like I was, you are brought up with the value that every life is sacred, then pro-life values become your spectacles in which you view the the sanctity of a fetus. Likewise, if you lived in Ohio through the 1990’s and you witnessed jobs supplanted overseas, then the Republican platform doesn’t look so bad. But if your personal experiences were lived in, say, San Francisco, California, then it will contrast greatly with West Virginians as liberal values of tolerance, preserving the earth, and multi-culturalism is elevated to supreme importance.

It’s not that West Virginian’s, pro-lifers, and Ohioan’s are dumb or ‘deplorable’, they simply elevate certain values over others. Keep in mind, with the examples I provided, each value is seen as a noble virtue. Sanctity of life, even for an unborn fetus, is based on the pursuit of establishing what is noble and virtuous.  Coal miners and Ohioans value loyalty to one’s country, which involve the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness. Let’s be honest, I think most of us want our government to be loyal to hard working Americans, rather than betray us in order to profit from setting up jobs abroad.

My greater point is this: whether it’s West Virginia or San Francisco, these are virtuous goals that have their aim at virtuous ends. By and large, children in Red States are raised by parents who impose on them values that seek the good. I should know, I am a product of Texas and a stereotypical Texan ideology. Where things get muddy is when you have competing values that compete for supremacy. I mean, if all values seek the good, can we say that some are wrong?

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Right/Wrong or Better/Worse

When judging values, we should not speak in terms of right or wrong, rather we should look at competing values in terms of better and worse. When talking about values, thinking in terms of right and wrong will result in completely invalidating the other side of the discussion.

Your values are your baby, so to speak. You hold them dear, because they speak to your life experiences and cultural upbringing. When someone says that your values are wrong, the conversation is off to a bad start from the beginning. Invalidating someone’s values shifts the conversation to a defensive mode. Instead, you can validate someone’s values, and then become ‘Socratic’ by asking questions back-and-forth as you hash out which values actually advance progress, human rights, justice, etc. Common ground is good foundation to have, and this begins by understanding that the other side is truly trying to come from a place of virtue.

When talking about values, thinking in terms of better and worse will recognize the virtuous aims of both sides, while also recognizing that some values ought to be elevated over others. Moreover, better or worse dialogue frames the dialogue in a way that doesn’t get personal, rather, you can simply discuss the effects of values in the public sphere.  Given that values are noble and based on virtue, it’s their externalities that need to be discussed. By externalities, I mean the side effects, blow-back, and consequences of the value when it is fully cashed out in everyday life. For example, early missionaries would visit foreign tribes and not only try and convert them, but also provide food and supplies to help them flourish. From this standpoint, the missionaries can be seen as virtuous. But some missionaries also brought over (unintentionally) diseases that devastated the villages. Thus, we can assess the externalities or consequences and conclude that this was probably not the best idea given the negative side effects it brought upon innocent villagers. It’s not that the missionaries immoral, per se, it’s just that there are better ways to advance the value of generosity and compassion.

In addition to a better or worse thinking rather a right or wrong way, there is another clarifying point I’d like to make. There is a common tendency to confuse value judgements with moralistic judgements. Value judgements reflect our beliefs of how best life can be served. We make moralistic judgements of people and behaviors that fail to support our values judgments; for example, “Anyone who votes for Trump is off their rocker.” In this example, the claim is trying to classify and judge a huge swath of people on moralistic grounds, with a tacit jab that labels Trumpians crazy. This tactic is similar to the one used by Ronald Reagan when calling the U.S.S.R.  an “evil empire.” The Germans also resorted to this by classifying the Jews with negative connotations like “cockroaches.”. Going back to the Trump claim, a more compassionate and enlightened way to articulate this sentiment would be, “I am worried about many of Trump’s policies; I value policies that unite the country and help the poor economically.” Now, this is a value judgment that doesn’t classify or analyze on moral grounds every single Trump voter, rather, it gives voice to your values and needs.

Final Words

Values reflect what we find important to make life better. The formation of our values is cultivated and refined based on our life experiences and influenced by our cultural surroundings. When I was in Texas preparing myself for a pro-life rally in 2001, my actions were guided by values rooted in virtue. Granted, my values were much different than most people in blue states. However, my values later changed due to personal experiences with liberal thinkers who lived out a value system that spoke to my heart. Moreover, I was able to live in the U.K. where I was exposed to different values and thinking that called into question my worldview. What didn’t change me was an intellectual argument or some liberal calling me a ‘southern redneck’. What didn’t change me was someone telling me I’m wrong, or that I needed to be more educated. Rather, it was through compassionate discussions where we worked through, not right and wrong, but the question: what makes life better?

Who’s to say what my values will be in 2030? Or what they will be if I move to Mississippi? All I know now is that I am guided by a value system that is surrounded by a plethora of other value systems. My value system is not the “right one,” rather, it simply speaks life into how I live and make my decisions. And when I hear competing values shouted by a person from a different culture than mine, I hope to take a deep breath, realize that he/she is simply expressing a deep need they have, and then perhaps I can share my values and needs without fostering judgement, evaluations of their character, or moralistic analysis. In the end, compassionate dialogue changes lives, not right/wrong judgement.

 

Moral Rules vs. Social Conventions

Written over two days, finished at Starbucks now (2/25/16) before work, with a blonde roast and no music because I forgot my dang ear buds at home. This essay was inspired by the studies published by Elliot Turiel, Richard Shweder, Daniel Kelly, Steven Stich, Jonathan Haidt, and Joshua Greene.

Introduction

untitledrferf32Most people are likely to agree that it is okay to wear your pajamas to the symphony if everyone else does. While this kind of behavior may seem odd, wearing pajamas at the symphony is not beyond the realm of plausibility. Most people are also likely to agree that after you have entered the symphony hall, it is never okay to throw a rock at the bassoonist just because his pacing sounded forced, even if everyone else is doing this. These cases appear to lie along a spectrum (which may include more ambiguous cases such as eating the neighbor’s dead dog with their permission or using someone else’s toothbrush). Oscar Wilde said that morality is like art, you have to draw the line somewhere. So where do we draw the line between moral issues and social convention?

Commonsense intuition seems to recognize a distinction between two quite different sorts of rules governing behavior, namely moral rules and conventional rules. Prototypical examples of moral rules include those prohibiting killing or injuring other people, stealing their property, or breaking promises.  Prototypical examples of conventional rules include those prohibiting wearing gender-inappropriate clothing (e.g. men wearing dresses), licking one’s plate at the dinner table, and talking in a classroom when one has not been called on by the teacher. While this field of moral psychology is nuanced and complex, when we reflect upon the differences of morality and social conventions, we gain a better understanding of other cultures.

The importance of this topic is justified by the fact that every culture is unique in its values and virtues. Unfortunately, this “uniqueness” makes it difficult to understand how some cultures can promulgate certain moral rules – which may seem like simply social conventions to Western eyes. The benefit of reflection of moral rules and social conventions affords one the opportunity to expand our moral domain so that we can see morality less parochially (narrow) and more compassionately.

Moral Rules

ljkhb;kMoral rules can be understood as applying universally and to derive a normative force from principles that hold independently of the dictates of political or social authorities. Going back to the symphony case above, the act of throwing a rock at the bassoonist carries an element of harm that is different than wearing your pajamas in a formal environment. Moral rules have more of an objective and prescriptive force and are not dependent on the authority of any individual or institution. Therefore, torturing babies or killing all blonds is wrong no matter what institution or even geographic domain condones the actions. Typically, violations of moral rules will involve a victim who has been harmed, or whose rights have been violated, or who has been subject to an injustice.

Social Conventions

By contrast, social conventions are contingent, local, and facilitate social coordination through shared understandings of etiquette and legal codes. Elliot Turiel proposed a set of features that sharply distinguished moral from conventional transgressions. Moral transgressions are (1) more wrong, (2) more punishable, (3) independent of structures of authority and (4) universally applicable. Social conventions however, are likely to lie along a continuum, stretching from transgressions of norms that are little more than matters of personal preference (e.g., getting tattoos or wearing black shoes with a brown belt) to normative transgressions that are more likely to be matters for legitimate social sanction (e.g., violating traffic laws or not paying your taxes).

Moral Foundation Theory

Moral Foundation Theory, derived from Jonathan Haidt, is the best model to capture the universal cognitive modules upon which cultures construct moral matrices. Haidt identified five adaptive challenges that stood out most clearly: caring for vulnerable children, forming partnerships with non-kin to reap the benefits of reciprocity, forming coalitions to compete with other coalitions, negotiating status hierarchies, and keeping oneself and one’s kin from parasites and pathogens, which spread quickly when people live in close proximity. Thus, the five foundations include: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation – and a sixth one that Haidt later identified as liberty/oppression.

Each of these foundations elicit emotions in individuals ranging from compassion, anger, group pride, respect and disgust. Once again going back to the symphony illustration, throwing a rock at the bassoonist will violate the care/harm foundation. Likewise, re-distribution of wealth taps into the fairness/cheating sentiment, while promiscuous sex evokes the foundation of sanctity/degradation.

Morality is like taste receptors

What moral foundation theory helps us understand is that morality is similar to our taste receptors. All humans have five taste receptors, but we don’t all like the same food. Morality really is like a cuisine: it’s a cultural construction, influenced by accidents of environment and history, but it’s not so flexible that anything goes. You can’t have a cuisine based on tree bark, nor can you have one based on primarily bitter tastes. Cuisines, vary, but they all must please tongues equipped with the same five taste receptors. I can’t explain why one person prefers Mexican food to Italian, or how someone can drink tea without lots of sugar in it. As Haidt explains, moral matrices vary, but they all must please the righteous minds equipped with the same six social receptors. Recently I had a friend who sat down with a Muslim family in their living room. As my American friend sat, he crossed his leg such that the bottom of his left shoe was exposed to the family. The father mentioned that in his culture, this is offensive because the bottom of the show represents filthiness. This cultural and localized social convention was part of the family’s moral taste receptors.

Morality and Culture

kdfnvVirtues are social constructions. The aversion I have to Indian curry is analogous to the repulsion I have for people not being on-time. I have a past experience with curry that left me sick so my immediate evaluative force is colored by that negative experience. Same with tardiness, growing up with my dad always late for any event has structured my personal matrix, such that I judge tardiness with disgust. This also carries forth to the difference of children growing up in warrior cultures compared with children taught in a modern industrialized culture.

While virtues are indeed constructions, moral rules and social conventions vary from culture to culture. Richard Shweder, a psychological anthropologist, did one of the first studies that compared morality between cultures. Shweder lived in worked in Orissa, a state on the east coast of India, and found large differences in how Americans and Oriyans (residents of Orissa) thought about personality and individuality. Shweder offered a simple idea to explain why the self differs so much across cultures: all societies must resolve a small set of questions about how to order society, the most important being how to balance the needs of individuals and groups. These two primary functions have manifested in history as either sociocentric or individualistic. The sociocentric model dominated most of the ancient world, but the individualistic answer became a powerful rival during the Enlightenment. To see the contrasting moral complexion between Americans and Orissa, Shweder gathered up a team, came up with 39 short stories that touched upon moral rules that were presented to 180 children and 60 adults in Orissa, and then a matched sample in a park near Chicago.

Shweder’s results found that in Orissa the social order was the moral order. Indian practices related to sex, food, clothing, and gender relations were almost always judged to be moral issues, not social conventions. Morality was much broader and thicker in Orissa – compared to Chicago – and almost any practice could be loaded up with moral force. For instance, actions that Americans said were wrong but Indians said were acceptable was: “a man had a married son and a married daughter. After his death his son claimed most of the property. His daughter got little.” And actions that Indians said were wrong but Americans said were acceptable was: “in a family, a 25-year-old son addresses his father by his first name.”

There is a deeper difference with Shweder’s findings. The American (or Western) individualistic foundations of harm and liberty are the strongest indicators in judging morality, whereas in Orissa it was sociocentric model revolving around the foundations of sanctity and authority. Even in the United States, the social order is the moral order, but it’s an individualistic order built up around the protection of individuals and freedom. As Jonathan Haidt explains, the difference between morals and mere conventions is not a tool that children everywhere use to self-construct their moral knowledge. Rather, the distinction turns out to be a cultural artifact, a necessary by-product of the individualistic answer to the question of how individuals and groups relate. When you put individuals first, before society, then any rule or social practice that limits personal freedom can be questioned. If it doesn’t protect somebody from harm, then it can’t be morally justified. It’s just a social convention.

A Newer More In-depth Study on Morality and Culture

lkjnbThe major weakness of Shweder’s study is that he did not ask his subjects about harm. Rather, he focused more on rules of clothing, food, etc. Jonathan Haidt recognized this deficiency and created a new study that would give adults and children stories that pitted gut feelings about important cultural norms against reasoning about harmlessness, and see which force was stronger. Haidt’s quest was also to test Elliot Turiel’s findings that rationalism predicted that reasoning about harm is the basis for moral judgment. Contra Turiel, there was growing hypothesis as cognitive-developmental work progressed, to look at moral emotions in subjects.

Jonathan Haidt began his study by developing a series of short stories of “harmless taboo violations” that tested contrasted subjects in Philadelphia with subjects in Brazil. The subjects in Brazil consisted up people in northeastern Brazil, in Recife, where the population is much more socioeconomically poor compared with subjects in Porto Alegre, which is more European section in southern Brazil.

Haidt’s results were clear as could in support of Shweder. First, the result was confirmed that Americans mage a big distinction between moral and conventional violations. The upper class Brazilians looked just like the Americans in the stories. For instance, two stories used included a girl who pushes a boy off of the swing (a clear moral violation) and a boy who refuses to wear a school uniform (a conventional violation). In the working-class Recife, the subjects judged BOTH stories to be moral violations; contrasted with the Americans and upper-class Brazilians who judged only the swing-pusher to be in violation.

Second, Haidt’s findings found that Recife subjects said that the harmless-taboo violations were universally wrong even though they harmed nobody. The conclusion is that the moral domain varied across nations and social classes. For most of the people in the study, the moral domain extended well beyond issues of harm and fairness.

It is hard to see how a rationalist would explain these results. How could children self-construct their moral knowledge about disgust and disrespect from their private analysis of harm? There must be other sources or moral knowledge, including cultural learning or innate moral intuitions about disgust and disrespect.

Moral Triggers as Modularity

Dan Sperber and Dan Hirschfeld coined the term “modularity” to refer to the little switches in the brains of all animals. They are switched on by patterns that were important for survival in a particular ecological niche. For example, many animals react with fear the very first time they see a snake because their brains include neural circuits that function as snake detectors. As Sperber and Hirschfeld put it:

An evolved cognitive module – for instance a snake detector, a face-recognition device … is an adaptation to a range of phenomena that presented problems or opportunities in the ancestral environment of the species. Its function is to process a given type of stimuli or inputs – for instance snakes [or] human faces.

This is a good description of what universal moral “taste receptors” would look like. As Haidt states, they would be adaptations of long-standing threats and opportunities in social life. They would draw people’s attention to certain types of events (such as cruelty or disrespect), and trigger instant intuitive reactions, perhaps even specific emotions like disgust or anger.

This can help us understand the cultural variations between, say, the people tested in Recife compared to Philadelphians. Sperber and Hirschfeld distinguished between original triggers of a module and its current triggers. The original triggers are the set of objects fir which the module was designed (that is, the set of all snakes is the original trigger for a snake-detector module). The current triggers are all the things in the world that happen to trigger it (including real snakes, as well as toy snakes, curved sticks, and thick ropes). Haidt explains that modules can make mistakes, and many animals have evolved tricks to exploit the mistakes of other animals. For example, the hover fly has evolved yellow and black stripes, making it look like a wasp, which triggers the wasp-avoidance module in some birds that would otherwise enjoy eating hover flies.

Quick Thought On Innateness

Our morality has been organized in advance of experience. Original triggers (noted above) is an indispensable part of our nature. It used to be risky to claim anything about innate behavior. Fortunately, we have advanced a lot since the 1970s in our understanding of the brain, and now we know that traits can be innate without being hardwired or universal. As the neuroscientist Gary Marcus explains, “Nature bestows upon the newborn a considerably complex brain, but one that is best seen as prewired – flexible and subject to change – rather than hardwired, fixed, and immutable.”

To replace wiring diagrams, Marcus suggests a better analogy: The brain is like a book, the first draft of which is written by the genes during fetal development. No chapters are complete at birth, and some are just rough outlines waiting to be filled in during childhood. But not a single chapter consists of blank pages on which a society can inscribe any conceivable set of words. Marcus’s analogy leads to the best definition of innateness I have ever seen:

Nature provides a first draft, which experience then revises … “Built-in” does not mean unmalleable; it means “organized in advance of experience.”

Conclusion

What we can agree on is that both nature and nurture is integral to moral development. The constellation of cultural milieus provides the architecture for morality to have any force at all. A nation at war will modulate the ethic of freedom/liberty to a moral rule – or absolute. A country ravaged by oppression and exploitation may modulate the ethic of care/harm to high levels. Likewise, a society who has escaped fascist rule will modulate the role of authority to low levels and see democracy has a moral need. But the deeper question I have tried to address is the moral psychology of putting a moral rule and social convention in context. I believe it is when we transcend are own social context to understand other social contexts that we can expand our moral domain. I cannot help but view the world through WEIRD lenses. I am speaking of a (WEIRD) Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic perspective. Thus, when we understand moral foundations throughout different cultures, we begin to see less in black and white (or WEIRD) lenses and shift to seeing the world through a kaleidoscope of experiences. If a culture in the East views going to the symphony in one’s pajamas as a moral violation, then there is an opportunity for me, in my WEIRD mind, to increase my compassionate understanding through the process of trying to see the moral rule through another’s eyes.